One part of the narrative for Saturday’s Falcons-Seahawks game is Dan Quinn facing his old team and boss. The more interesting angle to me is this will be Quinn’s first playoff game as a head coach. His decisions will face more scrutiny than ever and, if the regular season is an indication, expect Quinn to be aggressive.
A Wall Street Journal analysis of in-game coaching decisions this season ranked Quinn as the fourth-most aggressive coach in the NFL. The study compared coaches' decisions against the league average in three categories--fourth down, "general offense and defensive playcalling . . . (and) special teams" The analysis considered "game situations," including score and time remaining.
Quinn's playcalling aggressiveness was about average, ranking 15th among the 32 head coaches. But he was fifth-most aggressive with his special-teams calls and seventh-most aggressive with his fourth-down decisions. (Seattle head coach Pete Carroll, Quinn's former boss, ranks in the middle of the pack at No. 17 overall in aggressiveness.)
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(Some caveats: The WSJ’s data didn’t include the final regular-season game. And the article is not clear on the specifics of its methodology regarding playcalling—Quinn, like all head coaches, does not make every offensive and defensive play call though he obviously is in charge of game plans.
However, the special teams (when to go for two or on-side kick, for example) and fourth-down categories are pretty straightforward. Quinn has been among the most aggressive coaches in those situations. My guess is that Quinn’s aggressiveness on fourth-down calls goes back to his wrongheaded decision to punt late in the game at San Francisco in 2015.
Actually, that’s more than a guess: Quinn has said several times that he regretted the call because it didn’t signal confidence in his team. That’s a qualitative reason to knock the decision. It was also the wrong call from quantitative standpoint because it decreased his team’s chances of winning.
Quinn has been more aggressive after that episode. But the strategy backfired in two Falcons losses this season.
Tied in overtime against Chargers, the Falcons failed to convert a fourth-and-one from their 45-yard line. San Diego went on to kick the winning field goal.
Against the Chiefs, a failed two-point conversion by the Falcons while trailing 27-22 with 11:57 still to play led to another two-point try when they went ahead 28-27—Eric Berry returned Matt Ryan’s interception for the first winning “pick two” in NFL history. In that game the Falcons also failed to convert a fourth-and-one at Kansas City's 10-yard line while down 27-16 with nine minutes left in the third quarter.
Quinn's decisions didn't work in those cases, but bad outcomes don't always mean bad decisions—for example, Brian Burke of ESPN Analytics offered a quantitative defense of Quinn's fourth-down call against the Chargers. But the primary reason head coaches don't take more chances, even if the number say they should, is that when unconventional decisions lead to losses it means intense public criticism and (maybe) decreased job security.
Starting Saturday, Quinn’s decisions will be examined more closely than ever. It will be interesting to see if he stays aggressive under the brighter lights of the playoffs.
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