Recounting his regiment’s experience during the Aug. 5-7 action near Utoy Creek, west of Atlanta, Maj. James T. Holmes with the 52nd Ohio Infantry recalled the Confederate artillery fire, which proved more destructive than any Holmes had experienced before in the Atlanta Campaign. He remembered that, as his regiment sought cover, they “never were shelled so before … but here, they poured them thick and fast upon us.”
A Southern gunner opposite Holmes, one delivering the shot and shell, noted of the day’s action in his diary, “I much prefer … being a cannoneer, as it gives me a chance to try my marksmanship.” This young artillerist, along with the others in Maj. Gen. William Bate’s Division, prepared for yet another Federal assault upon their well-prepared earthworks, as Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman continued his quest to sever all the remaining railroads running into the besieged city of Atlanta.
The Federals controlled the Western & Atlantic Railroad north to Chattanooga, and had destroyed the Georgia Railroad east through Decatur. That left the Atlanta & West Point and Macon & Western running south out of Atlanta supplying the Confederates in the city. To strike at those roads, Northern forces would have to get from the north side of Atlanta to the south.
The Army of the Ohio, under the command of Maj. Gen. John Schofield, was to start the move by swinging west of the city. But squabbling among Federal officers interfered.
Maj. Gen. John Palmer, serving in the Army of the Cumberland and reporting to Maj. Gen. George Thomas, received orders from Sherman to cooperate with and report to Schofield as they attempted to repulse the Confederates along Utoy Creek (the battle site today is in Atlanta’s West End neighborhood along Cascade Road). Palmer balked at the order, insisted he ranked Schofield, and refused to take orders from anyone except Thomas.
After many exchanges between Sherman and Palmer — delays that Sherman regarded as “equal to the loss of 2,000 men” — and even after the opening salvos at Utoy Creek, Palmer finally resigned. Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis stepped in to take charge of the XIV Corps. The rankling discussions at an end, Schofield’s force aligned along the banks of the Utoy and awaited reconnaissance, which soon provided accurate information.
Schofield wrote to Sherman, and with a prophetic outlook suggested, “To cross the creek will be a day’s work, and I reckon must be done in force.” Calculating the task ahead and readying his army, Schofield issued orders to attack on the morning of Aug. 5.
That morning, the blue coats surged forward, made some initial progress, then halted to regroup. The pause gave Bate time to heed the suggestion from Lt. Gen. S.D. Lee “to strain every effort to strengthen your line.” Bate refortified his position. When the Federals tried to renew their advance on Aug. 6, abatis and flying lead thwarted their forward progress. The Confederate line held, and the inconclusive affair proved costly to both sides, including the wounding of Bate. Yet the Confederates had repulsed the attack.
Lee congratulated the men of Bate’s Division, exclaiming, “Soldiers who fight with the coolness and determination that these men did will always be victorious over any reasonable number.”
As skirmishing continued along Utoy Creek, Confederate Maj. Gen. Joe Wheeler prepared his cavalry for their ride northward to destroy sections of the Western & Atlantic. If the horsemen could sever Sherman’s supply line — a turnabout on Sherman’s plan to sever the railroads supplying the Confederates — the tide of blue might recede from the environs of Atlanta. Next week, we will ride with Wheeler’s cavalry as they retrace much of the route through North Georgia followed earlier in the campaign.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
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