As October turned to November in the autumn of 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman spent much of the week exchanging messages by telegraph. The two officers were preparing for Sherman’s next move: Leaving Atlanta, cutting loose from his supply lines and embarking on a risky march through Georgia.
Although Sherman had previously sent Maj. Gens. George Thomas and John Schofield to protect Nashville and keep watch on Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee, the idea of two armies marching away from each other – Hood’s heading north, and Sherman’s heading east – made Grant nervous.
In Virginia, Grant remained at a stalemate against Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. With the presidential election looming, Grant could ill-afford a military blunder that might prevent Abraham Lincoln from obtaining a second term. After much discussion, on Nov. 2, Grant dispatched Sherman the news his subordinate had eagerly awaited: “I say, then, go as you propose.”
Sherman, writing from his headquarters in Kingston, assured Grant that Thomas possessed a force strong enough to repulse Hood, and promised of his intended movement, “I think Jeff. Davis will change his tune when he finds me advancing into the heart of Georgia instead of retreating, and I think it will have an immediate effect on your operations at Richmond.”
Like a child receiving an early Christmas present, Sherman, wide-eyed and eager to launch his march, perhaps exaggerated the impact his plan would have along the Richmond-Petersburg front.
Maj. Gen. Joe Wheeler and his cavalry remained the South’s best hope of repulsing any Federal movements in Georgia. On the same day Grant and Sherman exchanged the above dispatches, Wheeler reported to Hood on the movements of Sherman’s forces in Georgia. He indicated three corps advancing on Marietta, two outside Chattanooga, one at Rome, and one in Atlanta.
Wheeler provided an early warning — which Confederate officials did not give proper credence: “Prisoners and scouts now say Sherman will march to Savannah via Augusta.” The exact route would prove inaccurate, but the intelligence indicated the true destination.
As he readied the deployment of his various forces, Sherman operated with the extreme confidence of his soldiers.
“(We) were making rapid preparations for a march,” one soldier observed. “(We) knew not whither … (but) it was all right; Old Billy knew what he was about.”
“Old Billy,” or “Uncle Billy,” as many of his men called him, indeed “knew what he was about.” Sherman telegraphed Thomas in Nashville with final instructions, and communicated to Federal naval officers in the Atlantic off the Georgia shore to keep watch for him and his troops “about Christmas from Hilton Head to Savannah.”
While most of the various elements of his force converged on Atlanta in early November, Sherman informed Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, “When I leave Atlanta, it will contain little that will be of use or comfort to the enemy.” Sherman could have offered this same prediction for most of the small towns and villages along the Western & Atlantic Railroad in North Georgia.
“Uncle Billy” closed out the week, and neared the end of his stay in Kingston, by issuing Special Field Orders No. 119 to his army. In this directive, he informed his troops of “a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one.” He closed in promising to lead them “to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.” Next week, we will explore the initial actions toward those achievements.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
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