2. SAFE was not told that Georgia’s touchscreens violate the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA). HAVA requires a paper record of votes cast so that manual recounts can be conducted. Election Director Chris Harvey told SAFE members that electronic ballot records stored in Georgia’s voting machines are the same as paper records because a paper printout can be created. This claim would require the state to trust the validity of internally stored electronic records on hacked machines. Data stored on compromised machines must be presumed to be untrustworthy.
3.) Georgia owns 1,000 paper ballot scanners — enough to conduct elections — but SAFE was misinformed about the feasibility of using them. If 3 million voters cast their ballots in November, the average load per scanner is 3,000 ballots. The entire election could be conducted quickly and efficiently in this way. Harvey’s claim that the overloaded machines would be “smoking” is unsupported by evidence. Furthermore, other states have upgraded their scanning equipment and warehoused scanners identical to Georgia’s. Election officials I have spoken with in those states are willing to loan this equipment to Georgia.
4.) SAFE was misleadingly told that scanning of paper ballots is “old fashioned” and inconsistent with Georgia’s high-tech image. Just the reverse is true. Georgia’s reputation has been severely damaged by a series of technology- and cybersecurity-related fiascos. Election officials conflated hand-marking and hand-counting of paper ballots, made up claims about the “hackability” of paper ballots, and characterized paper ballots as a “step backward.” Cybersecurity experts agree that hand-marked paper ballots are the safe, modern alternative, a position that has been endorsed by the Department of Homeland Security and Congressional committees.
5.) SAFE was misinformed about the vulnerability of Georgia's current system to cyberattacks. Georgia's current election system is at high risk of attack and penetration. Claims that "voting machines are not connected to the Internet" (they are) bolster a false sense of security. Impartial examinations of Georgia's election system have debunked these claims that Georgia's system is secure. Intelligence agencies assesses the risk of attack as high. No forensic analysis of whether votes have been changed has occurred. National media coverage of Georgia's weaknesses is relentless. Election officials have shamefully excluded the public from legally protected observation. SAFE is being misled into believing self-serving, false assurances.
It is certain that Georgia’s voting machines will be scrapped sometime soon. SAFE recommendations will help determine public confidence in future elections. Mr. Kemp owes it to his commission and all Georgia citizens to correct this misinformation and accurately explain the cybersecurity realities of election integrity.
Richard DeMillo holds the Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Chair in Computer Science at Georgia Tech. He studies election security and serves on the advisory board of Verified Voting.