“Hood’s movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications. … To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him.”
Thus, we have Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s final assessment on the folly of continuing his pursuit of Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood and the Army of Tennessee.
While soldiers blue and gray occupied northeast Alabama at the end of October 1864, Federal troops in the XX Corps, left behind to safeguard Atlanta, began foraging expeditions to collect supplies for Sherman’s next campaign — an ominous sign for the rest of Georgia. Skirmishes occurred near Turner’s and Howell’s Ferries, at Ruff’s Station, and near South River.
Confederate cavalry also was busy, striking various points, cutting the telegraph line in Big Shanty (today’s Kennesaw) and raiding for supplies in other locations. As quickly as the wires fell, though, Federal work crews repaired the damage, stopping only briefly before resuming their work to destroy railroads not deemed vital to sustaining Sherman’s armies.
However, safeguarding the Western and Atlantic remained an important task. Although he had future designs to break from his supply line, Sherman still needed to keep the trains running, as he issued orders to return the “sick, wounded, and surplus trash” to Chattanooga.
While planning to lighten the load on his troops of any unneeded materials, Sherman also reduced his effective strength by sending Maj. Gens. David Stanley and John Schofield to Nashville to support Maj. Gen. George Thomas. Sherman believed with these reinforcements, the “Rock of Chickamauga” possessed an ample force to deal Hood.
Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, in a telegram to Sherman, offered a word of confirmation for his subordinate’s actions. He suggested once Sherman turned back toward Georgia, “I would not propose holding anything south of Chattanooga, certainly not south of Dalton. Destroy in such case all of military value in Atlanta.”
Perhaps Grant could read Sherman’s mind. Most certainly, Sherman’s wife, Ellen, could read between the lines of an Oct. 21 letter she received from her beloved.
Updating her on his recent activity in Gaylesville, Ala., Sherman boasted of “practising” his army in the art of foraging, a skill he professed they took to “like Ducks to water,” giving him confidence. “We won’t starve in Georgia.”
Meanwhile, Hood moved his own army westward, inching ever closer to the Tennessee River. Leaving their camp at Gadsden, Ala., on Oct. 22, the Southern soldiers moved to Brooksville, then Somerville. Resting for two days, they resumed their march, passing through Decatur en route to Tuscumbia.
Awaiting the arrival of cavalry reinforcements, Hood informed President Jefferson Davis that once he had the needed horsemen and the rain-swollen Tennessee subsided, he would “strike the enemy wherever a suitable opportunity presents, and that I will spare no efforts to make that opportunity.”
Hood and Sherman closed the book on October with grand designs for victory. Only one general would achieve his objective.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
For more on the Civil War in Georgia, follow the AJC: http://www.myajc.com/s/battleofatlanta/
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