Having failed with cavalry to destroy the two railroads running into Atlanta from the south, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman realized at the beginning of August 1864 that he must rely on his infantry to sever the supply lines that sustained Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood. As long as Hood’s men were getting food, ammunition and other provisions over the Atlanta & West Point and Macon & Western, they could hold the city against the Federal invaders.
Federal Maj. Gen. John Schofield and his Army of the Ohio began redeploying west of Atlanta; they arrived along the banks of Utoy Creek on Aug. 3.
Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis replaced Maj. Gen. John Palmer, who refused to take orders from Schofield rather than Maj. Gen. George Thomas, his usual commander. Refusing to comply with Sherman’s temporary command structure, Palmer resigned his commission. (Davis would soon gain a second star and an accompanying promotion to major general)
Palmer’s stubbornness afforded the Confederates time to strengthen their earthworks; yet when the Federals attacked, they enjoyed early success. The confusion of battle separated Schofield’s various elements and prompted a pause in the advance to allow the army to reform.
Renewing the assault on Aug. 6 — after allowing soldiers in Confederate Maj. Gen. William Bate’s Division time to fortify their position — the Federals found the fire too hot and eventually had to withdraw. Bate suffered many casualties, and the battle, which proved indecisive, prompted Sherman to bring up heavy artillery from Chattanooga and begin shelling Atlanta.
As the cannons roared, Hood sent orders for his cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. Joe Wheeler, to embark on a mission officials in Richmond had long requested. When Gen. Joe Johnston led the Army of Tennessee, he constantly pleaded with President Jefferson Davis to send Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s horsemen to Georgia to destroy the Western & Atlantic Railroad — Sherman’s supply line from the north — and force the Federals out of the state. Davis always responded with a reasonable question: Why not use Johnston’s own cavalry to do the work? Hood, unlike Johnston, decided to try.
Revisiting Dalton, scene of the opening salvos of the Atlanta Campaign in May, Wheeler and 4,500 Southern riders engaged Col. Bernard Laibolt’s garrison holding the town. Brief fighting ensued before Wheeler’s men vacated the area. While inflicting damage to the railroad in a few locations — damage the Federals quickly repaired — Wheeler’s mission accomplished nothing except to provide Sherman with a potential opening.
To exploit this opportunity, Sherman deviated from his new strategy of using infantry to strike the rail, and once again turned to his men in the saddle for action. Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick — an officer whom the unfortunate riders under his command had labeled “Kill-Cavalry” — rode off in the direction of Lovejoy’s Station. He arrived on Aug. 20 and met more than he had bargained for in Maj. Gen. Pat Cleburne. Cleburne, with the cavalry of Brig. Gen. William Jackson in support, repulsed the attack.
Kilpatrick returned to tell Sherman he had put the Macon & Western out of operation indefinitely; in truth, he did minimal damage, and the line was out of service for only a couple of days.
If Sherman needed yet another example of his cavalry’s inability to destroy rail lines, Kilpatrick provided the proof. Sherman returned to his foot soldiers. This time, the results were decisive.
The evening of Aug. 25 brought orders for most of the three Federal armies to begin marching southwest of Atlanta; the XX Corps remained near the Western & Atlantic crossing of the Chattahoochee River to protect the railhead. Hood and his subordinates, discovering the suddenly vacant Federal lines north and east of the city, assumed Wheeler had successfully broken Sherman’s line of supply, thereby forcing the Federals to retreat.
Almost a full day passed before the Confederates realized what really happened. On Aug. 28, lead elements of the Federals arrived at Fairburn and soon set about destroying the Atlanta & West Point. With the A&WP gone, the Macon & Western through Jonesboro was the last rail line still in Southern hands.
Cavalry alerted Hood to enemy movements to the southwest, yet he took time to ascertain the meaning of this reconnaissance. Once Hood realized the imminent danger near Jonesboro, he dispatched Lt. Gens. William Hardee and S.D. Lee, ordering the two officers to work together to repulse the Federals. When that was achieved, Lee would redeploy back to Rough and Ready (later known as Mountain View in Clayton County) while Hardee held Jonesboro. They could then set into motion a two-pronged attack on the reeling blue coats.
It was not to be. All too often since Hood had taken command, confusion among the Confederates and piecemeal attacks proved disastrous. The Battle of Jonesboro continued this trend. Interruptions reaching their destination delayed the Confederate assault until the early afternoon hours of Aug. 31.
After a day of hard fighting, Hood, fearing an advance on Atlanta, ordered Lee to return to the city, leaving Hardee severely outnumbered. While the fighting continued at Jonesboro, Schofield’s men cut the Macon & Western. As August ended, Hood realized he could no longer hold Atlanta.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
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