BROKEN PROMISES, POROUS POLICIES
The struggle over building the Ga. 400 extension inside I-285 was a defining moment for the Atlanta region. The road’s approval transformed Buckhead, Perimeter Center and other northern areas, fueling explosive development. Some Buckhead residents who fought the road were launched into careers in city politics. But broken promises also eroded public trust, with long-lasting effects on Georgia government.
A recap of 25 years of twisted rhetoric and dashed expectations:
Use of Toll Revenues
1988: Georgia and federal officials put in writing a clear mandate: Ga. 400 toll revenues can only be used for the 6.2-mile Ga. 400 extension inside the Perimeter, to acquire land and pay for design, construction and "costs necessary for the proper operation, maintenance, and debt service."
2002: Georgia and federal officials quietly modify the 1988 agreement. Ga. 400 toll revenues may now be used for a wide range of federally eligible transportation projects, as long as the Ga. 400 extension is kept up to par.
2002: Under Gov. Roy Barnes, toll revenues are used to buy land at Atlantic Station, sparking outrage. Sonny Perdue, who is running against Barnes for governor, calls for a criminal investigation. "Gov. Barnes and other state officials repeatedly assured Georgians that toll funds from Ga. 400 would only be used to pay off the construction bonds and finance maintenance on the road," Perdue notes in a press release.
2003: Newly victorious, Perdue directs the State Road and Tollway Authority to create a written policy governing expenditure of the toll money. That policy restricts spending of "excess toll revenues" to projects in the Ga. 400 corridor. But it turns out that the word "excess" conceals a broad exemption. Not defined as "excess," and therefore not covered by the restriction: any spending "that support[s] personnel and/or activities of the Authority."
2011: The state policy is quietly allowed to expire. SRTA officials say they still abide by its principles.
Ending the Toll
1989: The state writes to Atlanta's mayor, Andrew Young, that "all tolls shall be discontinued upon full payment of all bonds which are issued to finance construction of the Georgia 400 Extension and the Buckhead Loop."
2010: With the bonds nearly paid off, rumors simmer that the state won't take down the toll after all. Deal, during his campaign for governor, says he will work to bring down the toll by 2011.
2010: Perdue announces that, as rumored, the toll will continue. He says the state cannot afford to lose the revenue stream, in light of the corridor's phenomenal growth. He promises a list of Ga. 400 projects to be built with the added money. Furor erupts.
2011: Now governor, Deal says that ending the toll would break a contract; it will have to stay in place, as Perdue had decided.
2012: Mistrust of government, fueled by the Ga. 400 toll drama, endangers a $7.2 billion transportation referendum. A week and a half before the referendum, Deal announces that the toll will come down, after all, in 2013. Voters reject the referendum anyway.
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