MAY, 1864: Ordering his Army of Tennessee to fall back to Cassville, where he found good ground, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston planned to make a stand against the approaching Federals. However, during a late-night council of war, two of his three subordinates, Lt. Generals John Bell Hood and Leonidas Polk, did not endorse fighting on this soil (Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, Johnston's other direct report, arrived near the end of the meeting).
Thus, Johnston discovered the pitfalls often coming from councils of war!
Again, the Confederate soldiers fell back, crossing the Etowah River south of Cartersville and forming at Allatoona Pass on May 19.
Many troops became frustrated when the command to redeploy went out. Earlier in the day, one Kentucky soldier noted in his diary, “A battle order was read … stating the time had come to decide matters by a general battle. The order was ‘Napoleonic’ and elicited loud cheers from the troops.”
After learning of the decision to move away from Cassville without engaging in battle, the same soldier went back to his diary. One can imagine his sense of frustration when he penciled,“’Tis said the reason we did not fight at Cassville was, Hood and Polk declared they could not hold their position.”
Large armies on active campaign require tremendous amounts of food and matériel for not only the soldiers, but for thousands of horses and mules. One wartime estimate suggested each horse required a daily ration of 10 gallons of water, 12 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay. Little wonder, as both armies moved through Georgia, they ravaged the surrounding countryside in search of provisions.
Beginning May 20, the combatants took a brief respite to gather supplies and rest the troops. A soldier with a New York regiment recalled, “We were informed there would be no movement for several days. This would not only give us a good rest, but time to clean up and do our washing.”
Campaigning for less than three weeks, the maneuvers placed Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman approximately 45 miles closer to Atlanta; with each mile lost, anxieties increased for citizens across the “Empire State of the South.”
Atlanta Mayor James M. Calhoun, upon learning of Johnston’s movement across the Etowah, issued a call to arms: “In view of the dangers which threaten us … I require all the male citizens of Atlanta, capable of bearing arms (to report) to be organized into companies and armed.”
The mayor ended his summons with a threat. Those men, he said, “not willing to defend their homes and families are requested to leave the city at their earliest convenience, as their presence only embarrasses the authorities and tends to the demoralization of others.”
A period of relative quiet continued until May 23, when Sherman took a wide swing to his right, leaving his supply line behind in hopes of finally turning Johnston’s flank.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
