Yes.
Vital to anti-terror war, enhanced interrogation helped find bin Laden.
By Marc A. Thiessen
In normal times, the officials who uncovered the intelligence that led us to Osama bin Laden would get a medal. In the Obama administration, they have been given subpoenas.
On his second day in office, President Barack Obama shut down the CIA’s high-value interrogation program. His Justice Department then reopened criminal investigations into the conduct of CIA interrogators — inquiries that had been closed years before by career prosecutors who concluded that there were no crimes to prosecute. In a speech at the National Archives in May 2009, Obama accused the men and women of the CIA of “torture,” declaring that their work “did not advance our war and counterterrorism efforts — they undermined them.”
Now, it turns out that those CIA interrogators played a critical role in what the president rightly called “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al-Qaida.”
It’s time for a public apology.
U.S. officials have acknowledged that the key piece of intelligence that led the CIA to bin Laden — information on the al-Qaida leader’s principal courier — came from detainees in CIA custody. According to a senior administration official, “detainees in the post-���� period flagged for us individuals who may have been providing direct support to bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, after their escape from Afghanistan. One courier in particular had our constant attention. Detainees gave us ... his nickname and identified him as ... a protege of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” The nickname was Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. KSM was taken into CIA custody in 2003 and refused to talk. Only after undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques did he confirm knowing al-Kuwaiti.
The following year, a senior al-Qaida operative named Hassan Ghul was captured. U.S. officials say he told the CIA that al-Kuwaiti was close to KSM’s successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi — a revelation officials described as the “linchpin.” In May 2005, al-Libi was taken into CIA custody. After being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided credible information on al-Qaida’s courier networks and specific individuals. But he became evasive when asked about al-Kuwaiti.
Some have suggested this shows that interrogation did not work. Quite the opposite, this was a red flag that led the agency to recognize al-Kuwaiti’s importance. It took years to find al-Kuwaiti and follow him to bin Laden’s compound. But without the information the CIA elicited from these high-value terrorists, the agency would not have known to look for him to begin with.
Thanks to Obama, however, this program is no longer part of America’s counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, outside of the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, there have been no reported U.S. detentions of high-value terrorists since Obama took office. Earlier this year, Umar Patek, the highest-ranking terrorist captured alive at this point in the Obama administration, was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities. Patek had traveled from Southeast Asia to Abbottabad — the same place where bin Laden was hiding. Coincidence? With whom did Patek meet and what did they discuss? He should be in CIA custody answering such questions.
Obama should restore the CIA interrogation program that made bin Laden’s demise possible — and instruct Attorney General Eric Holder to end his witch hunt against the heroes who helped lead us to bin Laden’s lair. That is the least Obama can do for the men and women responsible for the crowning achievement of his presidency. They don’t deserve a special prosecutor, Mr. President. They deserve the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
Marc A. Thiessen is a visiting fellow with the American Enterprise Institute.
No.
Torture is always illegal — under any law — and should remain so.
By Laurie R. Blank and Amos N. Guiora
In the aftermath of the successful operation to kill Osama bin Laden, pundits, politicians and others have tried to revive the debate over the use of “enhanced interrogation” — torture, to be blunt. It is said that some of the information used to track and locate bin Laden was obtained through the use of torture and other coercive methods and that, therefore, the raid demonstrates that torture is a valid tool.
But torture is not the story. Torture is illegal under United States law, international law and other national laws. Torture is illegal during wartime, peacetime, counterterrorism operations and any other circumstances. Beyond that, it is immoral and ineffective, as any seasoned interrogator will tell you. Torture is not the story — it was illegal before the bin Laden operation and remains illegal afterward.
News and commentary following the raid raise additional questions. Was bin Laden armed? Unarmed? Invited to surrender? Potentially susceptible to capture? Each tidbit of information undoubtedly makes for a better — or perhaps simply more sensational — news story, but whether bin Laden was armed is not a relevant story here.
As the leader of an armed organization against which we have been engaged in hostilities for nearly a decade, he was a legitimate target of attack at all times, armed or unarmed, on the battlefield or in his hideout. This was not a police investigation or sting, but a military operation designed to take out the leader of enemy forces.
So what is the story? The U.S. planned and executed a highly complex professional operation after years of painstaking intelligence work to connect the dots and trace an elusive individual and his closest cadre. In doing so, the U.S. military and intelligence communities demonstrated not only extraordinary competence, but also respect for the legal obligations of distinction, proportionality and precautions that guide all military operations. For that, all of us should be proud and grateful.
But as sober analysts have correctly suggested, the importance of killing bin Laden should not be exaggerated. Indeed, the latest news confirms the other key piece of the story: Although we recognize a clear tactical victory, we still do not know the strategic consequences of the raid. Intelligence gathered from bin Laden’s compound shows he was actively engaged in planning or conceiving of future attacks. The risk of retributive attacks surely exists as al-Qaida and other groups seek to prove their continued relevance.
Although the planning and implementation of this operation were flawless, the administration’s post-operation fumbling has struck a sour note. The seeming failure — in advance — to consider if the photo of a dead bin Laden should be released is a head scratcher. The inconsistencies regarding the possibility of capture also are puzzling. The Obama administration needs to refocus public attention on what matters here: the strategic ramifications and uncertainties arising after the operation.
Not all — if any — counterterrorism measures will benefit from the unique combination we saw here of a clear operational mandate from the president and extraordinary focus of efforts and literally unlimited resources for the intelligence community and operators in the field. Arguably more complicated tests lie ahead that will not benefit from the same laser-sharp focus. We should not distract from that focus with debates about torture, which is both illegal and ineffective. That is the real story.
Laurie R. Blank is the director of the International Humanitarian Law Clinic at Emory University School of Law. Amos N. Guiora is a law professor at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah.
