Southern victory at Kennesaw Mountain

Lincoln believed he had little to no chance of re-election that November as support for the war effort waned in the North and Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant’s casualty count from the Overland Campaign in Virginia continued to escalate. On June 7, the day before Sherman received 9,000 reinforcements when Maj. Gen. Francis Blair’s XVII Corps arrived, the Republican Party nominated Lincoln as its presidential candidate in the upcoming election.

The Federal armies in Georgia began advancing toward the Brush Mountain Line on June 10. Maj. Gen. James McPherson on the left moved south along the Western & Atlantic, while Maj. Gen. George Thomas in the center traveled the Sandtown Road toward Pine Mountain, and Maj. Gen. John Schofield swung to the right toward Lost Mountain.

Pine Mountain, held by Confederate Maj. Gen. William Bate’s men, created a salient-type position in the line. Pine Mountain rose some 300 feet above the surrounding terrain and extended north from the rest of Johnston’s line. This concerned the Southern chieftain, and on the morning of June 14, Johnston, Hardee and Polk rode forward to ascertain their ability to hold the mountain.

Climbing to its summit — today obscured by foliage, but during the war mostly void of trees — the three officers viewed the Federal forces maneuvering below, in their front. At the same moment, Sherman came riding along the Federal line. He spotted the three Conferate officers in plain view atop Pine Mountain. “How saucy they are!” he said, and he encouraged a nearby Indiana battery to throw a few shells toward the mountaintop.

The first shot prompted Johnston and Hardee to quickly seek shelter. But Polk lingered too long; another shell struck the “Bishop Militant,” and the South lost yet another officer.

Fearing Pine Mountain was no longer tenable, Johnston withdrew his forces from that position and on June 15 established the Gilgal Church Line. For two days, June 15 and 16, the Federals of Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield (writer of “Taps”) fought with Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne’s division. Repulsing each advance — as they had during the Battle of Pickett’s Mill — Cleburne’s men at first held firm. But elements of Schofield’s army got beyond the Confederate left, near Lost Mountain, and brought up artillery pieces, which began to enfilade Cleburne’s position.

Unable to hold at Gilgal Church due to the cannon fire rolling down the length of his line, Cleburne’s division fell back. On June 17, after “refusing” (re-forming) their left, the Confederates occupied the Mud Creek Line — today, the area of Dallas Highway west of Barrett Parkway. Artillery fire from Federal guns filled the sky along with the continuing rainfall, and the position along Mud Creek became very hot. The evening of June 18, Johnston ordered a retrograde movement to the Kennesaw Mountain Line.

Riding through Cobb County, cavalrymen with Maj. Gen. Joe Wheeler clashed with Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard’s horsemen along Noonday Creek on June 20. Minimal casualties resulted, as each side used their mounted forces to reconnoiter the region. Two days after that clash, Johnston moved Hood from the far right of the Kennesaw Line, near Big Kennesaw Mountain, to the Confederate left near Kolb’s Farm (the cabin still stands at Powder Springs and Calloway roads).

Johnston feared an attempt from Schofield to turn his left, thus the orders to Hood. However, Hood took the measure one step more, and on June 22 — despite having made no reconnaissance of the Federal troops in his front — he ordered an unauthorized attack. Maj. Gen. Joe Hooker’s forces, with artillery placed very effectively, repulsed Hood’s advance.

After almost three weeks of rain, the skies cleared on June 25, and Sherman and his troops on the west side of the Kennesaw Mountain Line began preparing for an attack. One month of maneuver warfare had evolved into a campaign of entrenchment, and Sherman was concerned his armies were becoming complacent. While an attack on a well-fortified position was risky, Sherman believed that if he could break through the Confederate line, his forces could sweep into Marietta, secure the Western & Atlantic, and place the Army of Tennessee in a very bad position.

Cannon fire on the morning of June 27 signaled to McPherson and Thomas that the time for the attack had arrived. Several elements of McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee would feint toward Big Kennesaw on the Federal left, while Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith’s XV Corps would attack Pigeon Hill. Thomas was assigned the primary attack of the day, in the center, and Sherman allowed the capable commander of the Army of the Cumberland to select his point of advance.

Hard fighting occurred at Pigeon Hill, as Brig. Gen. Francis Cockrell’s brave Missourians held the position. And despite repeated assaults along Thomas’ front, at a position that would earn the name Cheatham Hill, the Confederates under the command of hard-fighting Maj. Gen. Frank Cheatham repulsed the attack. The Federals took heavy losses.

Sherman suffered 3,000 casualties in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, while Johnston lost 1,000 men. The fight is credited to the South as a victory. In his post-battle report, Sherman stated, “The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it.”

One Federal soldier involved in the battle had a different take: “The whole affair was useless and a mistake, and Sherman’s reason given is not creditable to him or any good general, If any just reason had been given for the charge, we would have felt better.” Few had positive feelings as the month of June closed, especially the boys in blue trapped in the “dead zone” below Cheatham’s position.

Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net

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