YES: The Muslim Brotherhood’s goals are incompatible with democratic values.
By David A. Ridenour
One person, one vote, one time doesn’t make a country democratic. If the Muslim Brotherhood wins the election promised for later this year, one election may be all Egyptians ever see.
Former President Jimmy Carter assures us that the Brotherhood need not be feared because it will be “subsumed in the overwhelming demonstration of desire for freedom and democracy.”
I’m not comforted by words from a man known for his spectacular foreign policy miscalculations. Surely, he also believed democratic forces would prevail in Iran and Nicaragua when he allowed U.S. allies in both countries to be overthrown by fanatics in 1979.
Popular uprisings can be hijacked by organized and committed ideologues.
The ideologue-filled Brotherhood is Egypt’s best organized political group. Its objectives are incompatible with democracy, as it seeks an Islamic empire and to govern by Sharia law. In 2008, Muhammad Madhi Akef, then-Brotherhood Supreme Guide, said his organization supports democracy, but only the “right kind ... one that honors Sharia.”
Whenever democracy and Sharia law conflict, the Brotherhood eschews democracy. Its Palestinian branch, Hamas, says in its charter: “Any procedure in contradiction of Islamic Sharia ... is null and void.”
Although the Muslim Brotherhood claims to have renounced violence, its words and deeds suggest otherwise. One of its most infamous members, Abdurahman Alamoudi, is in U.S. federal prison for, among other things, planning with Libya to assassinate Saudi King Abdullah when he was crown prince.
The Brotherhood was also implicated in the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat. Sadat was killed by members of the Islamic Jihad, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, after Brotherhood-linked Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called “Blind Sheikh” who would later be convicted for planning the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, issued a fatwa ordering that Sadat be killed.
When Sadat died, so too did much of Egypt’s democratic progress.
Yusuf al-Quaradawi, arguably the Brotherhood’s most influential cleric, has repeatedly called for violence, saying homosexuals should be stoned and Israeli children murdered, lest they grow up to become soldiers.
Muhammad Mahdi Akef, who made international headlines a few years ago by labeling the Nazi holocaust a myth, said the Brotherhood “...will send fighters to join the resistance in Iraq and Palestine,” if permitted to do so by the Egyptian government. Now, the Brotherhood is closer than ever to taking over Egypt’s government and the power to grant itself permission to send its fighters to Iraq — fighters who could kill Americans.
The organization’s current Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badie, said just last October that Islamists must raise a “jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life.” How the Muslim Brotherhood would behave should it assume power in Egypt is no mystery. Consider how it’s governed in Gaza.
After winning a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006, Hamas took, according to Human Rights Watch, “extraordinary steps to control, intimidate, punish and at times eliminate their internal rivals.” Last year, the group charged Hamas with “egregious crimes” for ordering attacks on Israeli civilians.
Believing the Brotherhood to be a peaceful, democratic, civic organization reminds me of what Samuel Johnson said about remarriage: The triumph of hope over experience.
David A. Ridenour is vice president of The National Center for Public Policy Research, a conservative think tank in Washington.
NO: The Muslim Brotherhood’s clout is limited, and Egyptians favor pluralism.
By John B. Quigley
The Muslim Brotherhood is no threat to democratic development in Egypt. The Brotherhood is a well organized movement in Egypt, but it was not the spark for the protests that led to the recent change in government. Now that there is an opening for political activity in Egypt, the Brotherhood gives every indication that it will participate, and do so actively.
At the same time, the Brotherhood does not seem to be aiming at running Egypt’s government. Even though the Brotherhood figured as the main political force in opposition to the government of former President Hosni Mubarak, it does not enjoy anything near majority support in Egypt. Analysts give it a maximum of 20 percent of the electorate.
Significantly, the Brotherhood recently made a decision — publicly announced — not to put forward a candidate for the presidency of Egypt. The Brotherhood seems content to play a role, but not a leading role.
To be sure, the recent referendum on constitutional amendments plays in favor of the Brotherhood. These constitutional changes will allow parliamentary elections to be held at an early date. Other political elements wanted a longer time lapse before elections, so that they could organize more effectively. So the Brotherhood may come out stronger than its true support would warrant.
The Brotherhood does advocate a state governed on Islamic principles, but that aim does not suggest particular policies.
In Europe, political parties purporting to pursue a Christian agenda call themselves Christian Democrats. But the label “Christian” is hardly a guide to specific policies.
Turkey’s ruling party calls itself Islamic, yet Turkey remains pluralist. Egypt’s Brotherhood gives little indication that it seeks a state that would be governed with the policies that one sees in Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian public does not seem inclined in that direction.
The Brotherhood is at pains to ensure one and all that it favors a state in which adherents of Islam and all others would participate.
To be sure, the Brotherhood is likely to push the new Egyptian government to extend more active support for the Palestinians in their ongoing confrontation with Israel. But the new government is likely to take that approach in any event, since the public at large is restive over Mubarak’s reticence on the Palestine issue. There may well be a change in Mubarak’s closure of the border with Gaza, and a political opening to Hamas in Gaza.
In the longer term, the political fortunes of the Brotherhood may depend on outside circumstances as much as on internal developments. Islam has become a rallying cry to protect countries in that region from being dominated by the West.
Muslim fundamentalism is a reaction against the West. To the extent that the West, and particularly the U.S., gives what is perceived as cause, Muslim fundamentalism will grow.
The Brotherhood is more likely to remain moderate if the U.S. takes what is perceived in Egypt as a reasonable stance on the Israel-Palestine question.
We push the Egyptian public toward fundamentalism with actions like our recent veto in the U.N. Security Council of a draft resolution that would have criticized Israel for its civilian settlements in the Palestinian territory that is to be part of an independent Palestine. We were the only council member to oppose the draft.
A new test will come up in the fall when the Security Council is likely to be presented with a draft resolution to recognize Palestine as a state and perhaps to admit it to membership in the U.N. If we block that resolution, we will push Egypt in the wrong direction. To a degree, we hold the keys to the direction of the Brotherhood and of Egypt’s politics.
John B. Quigley is a professor of law at Ohio State University.
