“On reflection, I think better of your proposition. It would be much better to go south than to be forced to come north.”
At long last, on Oct. 12, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman received approval from Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to leave Atlanta and launch his march through Georgia.
However, “come north” Sherman would have to do, at least temporarily, as Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee continued to strike at the Western and Atlantic Railroad. As long as the Federals occupied Atlanta, they were vulnerable to Southern attacks on Sherman’s supply line out of Chattanooga. If the gray coats could sever the railroad, perhaps they could force Sherman to vacate the city. Sherman’s only recourse was to come after Hood.
Both armies endured a busy week of skirmishing and maneuvering, prompting an Ohio soldier to note, “Since leaving Atlanta, the enemy had led us on a wild chase of 170 miles, much of the way over mountain roads, which made the march very tiresome.”
He and the other soldiers in blue would continue the chase, as the elusive Confederate troops struck the railroad at Dalton and then attempted to take the garrison at Resaca. There, a resolute Federal officer held out. Deeming the position not worthy of bringing up reinforcements, the Confederates moved toward Tilton.
Lt. Col. Samson Archer and his 17th Iowa Infantry, a force of less than 300 troops, guarded the railroad leading to Resaca. Lt. Gen. A.P. Stewart’s corps pushed the Iowans back into their defense works at Tilton. Archer placed as many of his men as possible into a blockhouse, which soon came under fire from Stewart’s infantry.
After four hours of skirmishing, Stewart, perhaps following the lead of Hood’s earlier surrender demand at Dalton, sent an ultimatum to Archer. He closed his call for surrender with the vow, “If refused I will take the place and give instructions to take no prisoners.” Archer, mimicking the response of Col. Clark Wever at Dalton, answered, “I will not surrender; if you want my garrison you will have to take it.”
This exchange, and the similarities to the correspondence at Dalton, demonstrates the determined nature of officers on both sides.
Receiving Archer’s refusal to lay down his arms, Stewart brought up his artillery and began throwing shells into the blockhouse. Nevertheless, the Federals held.
According to Archer’s after-action report, only when the Confederates unleashed their 24-pound Napoleons did things get very hot inside the blockhouse. Archer described how each striking shell “shattered its timbers and shook the building as if it were a reed.” Eventually, abused reeds wither, and so did Archer. After the 47th shell, he surrendered the position. The capture of Federal supplies at Tilton enabled the Confederates to restock with much-needed food and other matériel.
Shifting toward Snake Creek Gap, Hood positioned his forces and awaited Sherman’s next move. The Federal chieftain sent Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard toward the gap while dispatching Maj. Gen. David Stanley to Villanow; once Stanley assembled his force, they would strike through the back of the gap, hitting Hood’s army from the rear.
Skirmishing ensued between Hood’s and Howard’s soldiers, and as the intensity increased, Hood decided to withdraw through the gap. He executed this retrograde movement before Stanley’s troops could get into position. The elusive boys in gray avoided another potential trap.
Leaving Snake Creek Gap, Hood turned his army westward and marched in the direction of La Fayette. On Oct. 18, Confederate infantry left Georgia and entered Alabama — never to fight again in the Empire State of the South for the balance of the war. Hood established his headquarters near Gadsden, Ala.
Sherman’s armies continued the pursuit into Alabama. For a brief period, both forces trod Alabama soil, leaving behind the much-fought-over terrain of North Georgia.
One of Sherman’s junior officers described the chase in his diary: “The Johnnys keep ahead of us all the time trying to capture the places on the Rail Road where we have supplies stored, but as a general thing they fail for we are so close on their heels they do not stop long.”
Both forces would rest for a time in Alabama, as Hood and Sherman contemplated the future.
Michael K. Shaffer is a Civil War historian, author and lecturer. He can be contacted at: www.civilwarhistorian.net
For more on the Civil War in Georgia, follow the AJC: http://www.ajc.com/s/opinion/ and http://www.myajc.com/s/battleofatlanta/
About the Author
