TWO VIEWS

“I have great confidence in the security and the effectiveness of our ICBM force. And, very importantly, I want you to know that this was a failure of some of our airmen. It was not a failure of the nuclear mission.”

Deborah Lee James, Air Force secretary

“This is deeply concerning. Not only for what it says about the readiness of the officers involved and perhaps the broader community to which they belong, but for the noticeable fraying of integrity it demonstrates.”

Tony Carr, retired Air Force officer

At what point do breakdowns in discipline put the country’s nuclear security in jeopardy? And when does a string of embarrassing episodes in arguably the military’s most sensitive mission become a pattern of failure?

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is now concerned “there could be something larger afoot here,” according to his chief spokesman, and “wants this taken very, very seriously.”

The disclosures of disturbing behavior by nuclear missile officers are mounting and now include alleged drug use and exam cheating. Yet Air Force leaders insist the trouble is episodic, correctible and not cause for public worry.

The military has a well-established set of inspections and other means of ensuring the safety of its nuclear weapons. But as in any human endeavor, military or civilian, the key to success is the people, not the hardware.

Until recently, Hagel had said little in public about the setbacks and missteps in the nuclear missile force.

Last week, Hagel made the first visit to a nuclear missile launch control center by a Pentagon chief since 1982. He praised the force’s professionalism, even though minutes before, officials had informed him that a few missile launch officers at another base were suspected of illegal drug use.

Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James, just four weeks into her tenure as the service’s top civilian official, told reporters Wednesday that the Air Force’s chief investigative arm is investigating 11 officers at six bases who are suspected of illegal drug possession.

She said that probe led to a separate investigation of dozens of nuclear missile launch officers for cheating on routine tests of their knowledge of the tightly controlled procedures required to launch missiles under their control.

At least 34 launch officers, all at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., have had their security clearances suspended and are not allowed to perform launch duties pending the outcome of the investigation.

The alleged cheaters are said to have transmitted test answers by text message to colleagues.

The commander at Malmstrom, Col. Robert W. Stanley II, said in a telephone interview Friday it’s not “off base” to think that the cheating points to a deeper problem in the intercontinental ballistic missile force.

“But I do think it’s far more than just us. I think this is a sort of cultural thing our society is going through” in which too many people have grown accustomed to “putting blinders on and just walking past problems.”

This is reflected in the cheating scandal, he said, where 17 of the 34 did not cheat but knew about the cheating and failed to report it.

“In ICBMs, we can’t tolerate that,” Stanley said.

In response to the cheating, the Air Force retested every available ICBM launch control officer at Malmstrom as well as the two other bases operating Minuteman 3 missiles: F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and Minot Air Force Base, N.D.

Tony Carr, a recently retired Air Force officer, is calling for bold action in response to the cheating scandal.

“This is deeply concerning. Not only for what it says about the readiness of the officers involved and perhaps the broader community to which they belong, but for the noticeable fraying of integrity it demonstrates,” he wrote Thursday in a public blog.

The men and women who are entrusted with the keys to the nation’s 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with at least one nuclear warhead capable of inflicting mass destruction halfway around the globe, are among the youngest officers in the Air Force.

Their competence is not in question, only their motivation in a job that some see as unrewarding and overly stressful.

Loren Thompson, head of the Lexington Institute, a defense-oriented public policy advocacy group, said he thinks part of the problem may be the “diminished status” of the nuclear mission in the post-Cold War era.

“Although missile forces remain crucial to deterring nuclear attack, they are no longer seen as a prestigious assignment in the Air Force,” he said.