Pro and Con: Should the Senate ratify New START weapons accord?

By Paul D. Eaton

Yes: Treaty protects against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Through repeated tours at Fort Benning and eventually serving as its commanding general, I got to know Georgia and Georgians pretty well.

Among the places I have served, my neighbors around Fort Benning display a pride, patriotism and national security awareness that helped me in my mission at the Home of the Infantry. And they are natural allies to those of us in uniform who devote our careers to America’s national security.

Sens. Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson will soon have the opportunity to protect America’s national security by voting in favor of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, which would further a process started by Ronald Reagan to verifiably reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to 1,550 warheads and 700 deployed launchers.

New START also ensures strategic stability by reinstating a strong verification regime that allows U.S. inspectors, for the first time, to peer inside Russian missiles and track warheads with unique identifiers.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has written, “The New START Treaty has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership — to include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the service chiefs, and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the organization responsible for our strategic nuclear deterrent.”

Recently, I joined a group of retired flag officers, including Lt. Gen. Dirk Jameson, former commander of all ICBM units and Deputy Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, in expressing my support for the New START accord. Like Secretary Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, we understand that New START is essential to national security.

For more than 40 years, the U.S. has pursued strategic stability through an arms control process that has been vigorously supported by Republicans and Democrats alike. The New START Treaty both continues these established principles and tailors them to meet the security needs of the 21st century.

In today’s security environment, we must protect against the dual threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. With the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia accounting for nearly 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, the first step to nuclear security begins with New START.

The original START agreement expired Dec. 5, 2009, leaving the U.S. without the intrusive inspection and verification regime that allowed U.S. inspectors to monitor Russia’s nuclear arsenal for so many years.

The U.S. Senate should work to reinstate these verification provisions by ratifying New START and getting U.S. boots back on the ground.

Without these measures, our strategic command loses its access to Russia’s nuclear forces, and the predictability between the world’s two largest nuclear powers is called into question.

Some have argued that we’ve not yet fully explored the treaty. That’s not true. The Senate has held an extensive series of hearings and meticulously reviewed the treaty and its accompanying documents.

Throughout this process, serious national security experts of all ideological stripes have voiced strong support for the New START treaty. James Schlesinger, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Stephen Hadley and Colin Powell have all expressed strong support for this treaty.

Gen. Brent Scowcroft, George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser, previously warned senators that a rejection of this treaty would throw our nuclear policies into a “state of chaos.”

The support for New START from our military is clear. The national security benefits of New START are clear. So is the choice.

Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, retired, served more than 30 years in the United States Army, including a tour as command of the Army Infantry Training Center in Fort Benning.

By Robert R. Monroe

No: Treaty undermines deterrence, bedrock of peace for 65 years.

The Senate is now urgently addressing the issue of whether President Obama’s “New START” nuclear weapons treaty with Russia should be ratified. The administration is calling on every possible resource to gain the needed 67 votes, but the reasons for denying ratification are overwhelming.

First, the treaty itself is a wholesale giveaway. Virtually every provision limits future U.S. strategic programs, while imposing no meaningful restrictions on Russia. For example, New START does not count the thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, including new ones, while it seriously limits two vital U.S. non-nuclear programs: missile defense and prompt global strike. With regard to strategic delivery vehicles, New START requires the U.S. to reduce existing and needed land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers, while allowing Russia to increase theirs.

New START is unverifiable. It does not even include the same missile production monitoring, on-site inspections, and telemetry access of the START-I treaty it would replace. Moreover, it fails to count several types of strategic nuclear weapons and it disregards President Reagan’s “trust, but verify” rule.

Secondly, and more important than the treaty, is the master plan behind it. President Obama’s new national policy for nuclear weapons totally reverses the strong nuclear deterrence policy that has kept America safe since the dawn of the nuclear era. This revolution in nuclear matters is set forth in Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of last April. It directs America to substitute a policy of nuclear weakness for one of strength, in the hope that this will lead to “a world without nuclear weapons.” And he promised to take “concrete steps” to get us there.

These two documents — the NPR that establishes future U.S. nuclear policy, and the New START treaty that begins its implementation — are inseparably linked. If the Senate does not support weakening our deterrent, then it certainly must reject the treaty which initiates the new policy.

Now, look at the NPR. Emphasis throughout is on “devaluing” nuclear weapons. It treats them as an evil to be eliminated, rather than as the highly effective foundation of America’s security in a world of unknown dangers. It discards the deterrent that succeeded flawlessly in preventing both nuclear weapons’ use and the outbreak of major war for 65 years, and was supported by 11 presidents and Congresses of both parties. And this while the other eight nuclear-weapons states, plus rogue Iran, are all improving or increasing their nuclear arsenals.

Obama’s NPR prohibits development of new nuclear missions or new nuclear capabilities. It prohibits nuclear testing, undermining our confidence in the reliability of U.S. weapons. It prohibits production of new nuclear weapons, which prevents our deterrent from evolving with the threats. It further undermines our deterrent by showing lack of will and resolve. The NPR contains an entire chapter on reducing the role of nuclear weapons, thereby limiting the overall effectiveness of our deterrent.