Three Views: Afghanistan’s fate

By Dan Reiter, chairman of the political science department at Emory University, author of “How Wars End”

An important lesson from the Vietnam War: You can’t defeat an insurgency unless the local government is reasonably effective, legitimate and honest. We might achieve something resembling an acceptable outcome in Iraq because that government could be en route to achieving those goals. As Gen. Stanley McChrystal and others have noted, we cannot win in Afghanistan unless the Afghan government moves in a similar direction.

Larger numbers of troops, whether U.S. or NATO, cannot solve the problems generated by a fundamentally rotten government. The Afghan government is not on this path now. In the August election, nearly a quarter of votes were cast at polling stations under investigation for fraud. Corruption is rampant.

We should use the possibility of greater U.S. troop commitments as a tool to push the Afghan government toward higher accountability and competence. If the Afghan government fails to budge, we must not be afraid to walk away. As we also learned from Vietnam, American blood is too precious to expend on a hopeless mission.

By

William O. Chittick, emeritus professor, Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia

The United States should not send more combat troops to Afghanistan unless our NATO allies agree to make comparable commitments. Terrorism is a global phenomenon, and it requires a multilateral response. It would be difficult for the United States to sustain a successful strategy in Afghanistan without the full support of its European allies. Moreover, the addition of new NATO forces would give allied commanders more options in Afghanistan. Increased capacity could enable field officers to rely less (not more) frequently on lethal measures. This would also help build support for NATO forces among the Afghan people. In this regard, the allies should be encouraged to provide the type of force in which they have a comparative advantage. There is a need for both combat and noncombat units. Because this situation demands a multilateral and multifaceted approach, calls for a precipitous, unilateral commitment of American forces are foolhardy.

By Henry F. Carey, associate professor of political science, Georgia State University

The effort in Afghanistan now seems to be a strategic choice between counter-insurgency, advocated by Gen. McChrystal, which is a much more comprehensive and troop-intensive approach, and counter-terrorism, advocated by Vice President Biden, which focuses more narrowly on fighting the Taliban.

The former approach would require more troops from NATO, as well as the United States. It’s based on the semi-successful surge model from Iraq, which also needed Sunni domestic forces to switch toward fighting al-Qaida in Mesopotamia instead of fighting the Iraqi government.

The latter strategy might or might not need more troops from either the U.S. or NATO, since Pakistani troops are fighting the Taliban on its own territory. But Afghan troops are not reliable in the fight in Afghanistan.

The problem with the counter-terrorism approach is that it predictably causes, and thus relies on intolerable levels of civilian collateral damage in order to kill insurgents via drones and large-scale attacks. It is intolerable because of the anti-U.S. hostility and inducement to terrorist recruitment that it causes, as well as being arguably illegal and immoral.

Neither approach in recent years has focused on al-Qaida, because the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaida are equated by U.S. policy officials. The dilemma is whether to keep trying or admit that the goals are unachievable. Given the unexpected success in Iraq from the surge, few are willing to suggest that Afghanistan cannot also be won. In truth, Iraq has not been won, but defeat was avoided.

Compiled and edited by Tom Sabulis, tsabulis@ajc.com