I am not an Eliot Spitzer fan. The now-former New York governor and I have disagreed privately and publicly on any number of issues, mostly involving questions of prosecutorial abuse. Still, I have great concern with the manner in which his fall from grace was orchestrated, and with the federal laws and regulations on which it was based. The sad saga of Spitzer should concern every American, or at least all those who maintain accounts at any financial institution or who engage in any form of electronic financial transactions.

The web of snooping in which federal investigators and regulators are now able to ensnare any person who engages in any form of financial transaction has become so complex and pervasive that almost no person anywhere in the world can escape its clutches. The ability of the government to manipulate this vast power is magnified manyfold by virtue of the manner in which our laws and regulations require the active complicity of the entire cadre of persons working in, or in some manner connected with, banks and other entities that provide or facilitate financial transactions.

The seeds of this modern-day Orwellian financial web were sown in the late 1960s and early 1970s when such expansive federal laws as the Bank Secrecy Act were enacted with bipartisan support. Designed as tools to ferret out organized crime figures, major drug traffickers and international money launderers, this family of far-reaching regulatory-cum-criminal laws initially was used largely as intended. During this era also, many of the "Suspicious Activity Reports" (or SARs) required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, for example, were largely ignored by investigators and prosecutors, who viewed them as burdensome and difficult to catalog and utilize. Bank employees were not pressured to file such reports as an operative component of their job descriptions.

Two events have conspired to change all that. First, the advent of digital technology has elevated dramatically the ability of the government to gather, analyze, manipulate, retrieve and disseminate the SAR data. In the digital age, there are virtually no limits on the ability of agents to use high-speed computers to identify, correlate and retrieve the data in ways limited only by imagination.

The second factor changing the power of using SARs and the reporting requirements in the sister "Currency Transaction Report" (CTRs) and other federal reporting instruments, was, of course, the events of 9/11 and the ensuing USA Patriot Act. These two things institutionalized fear as the driving force in virtually all federal policies, including those relating to financial reporting.

Now, these and other federal reporting forms must by law be filed whenever any person —- terrorist, criminal or simply law-abiding student, housewife or lawyer —- engages in a broadly defined "financial transaction" at an equally broadly defined "financial institution." The SAR, for example, is triggered whenever someone in the employ of, or connected with, that institution concludes there is something "suspicious" about a transaction (either alone or in conjunction with other, perhaps nonsuspicious, activities). If the suspicions of the employee are aroused while the customer is engaged in the questionable transaction, then the law requires that the act be reported immediately.

Lest a banking customer take solace in the belief that "surely the government would not concern itself with small transactions," be reminded that "suspicious" transactions as small as $2,000 must be reported.

Any suspicion by a bank employee, for example, that a transaction is intended to violate or evade any federal law or any federal regulation (of which there are tens of thousands on the books) could prompt a report. Reportable suspicions clearly need have nothing to do with suspected terrorist activities or even suspected violations of federal felonies.

Ignorance is bliss —- the law prohibits financial institutions from notifying anyone that a "suspicious activity" has been reported to Uncle Sam.

Oh, by the way, if you think you're safe from the prying electronic eyes of the federal government and all those employees of financial institutions spying on its behalf if you can somehow manage to keep all your banking transactions under $2,000, forget it. Another federal law —- this one in the Patriot Act —- has been interpreted by banking examiners to require banks to profile their customers and the full range of their transactions, regardless of amount. These "know your customer" regulations are among the most insidious of this entire class of invasive federal laws and regulations.

> Former congressman and U.S. Attorney Bob Barr practices law in Atlanta. Web site: www.bobbarr.org.

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