The resignation of Adm. William Fallon as head of Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for the Middle East and Central Asia, was both appropriate and necessary. Given the public disdain Fallon has expressed for the policies and abilities of President Bush, no other course was possible.

Those sentiments are expressed most recently, and most clearly, in the current issue of Esquire magazine. The headline of the piece describes Fallon as "The Man Between War and Peace"; its author, defense analyst and writer Thomas P.M. Barnett, clearly had great access to the admiral. Barnett lays out Fallon's disagreements with the president on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and other issues, depicting Fallon as a man who basically sets his own foreign policy agenda.

The admiral — a well-respected officer with an otherwise fine record — has long been vocal about the foolishness of using the military to end Iran's nuclear ambitions. In fact, in the past year his opposition and that of other senior military officers has helped take that option off the table.

Now his forced resignation is being interpreted by some as a sign that an attack on Iran is again being considered. As the opening line in the Esquire piece puts it, "If in the dying light of the Bush administration, we go to war with Iran, it'll all come down to one man [Fallon]. If we do not go to war with Iran, it'll come down to the same man."

However, conversations with military officials and other indicators suggest that's highly unlikely. Fallon's more serious dispute with the Bush administration centers on Iraq, not Iran.

Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq and Fallon's nominal subordinate, strongly advocates keeping more than 130,000 troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future, to protect what he sees as the gains from the recent surge. Fallon, on the other hand, doubts the long-term effectiveness of the surge and has made it clear that he wants to draw down our force in Iraq more quickly.

President Bush — in his role as the Decider — has chosen to side with Petraeus, not Fallon, which suggests that current troop levels in Iraq could be maintained through the end of his presidency.

Fallon's recommendation in part reflected his larger responsibilities as Centcom commander. In that role, he also oversaw U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, where a lack of manpower has seriously compromised our chances of success. Fallon understood that as long as Iraq consumes so many military resources, help for Afghanistan will not be forthcoming.

Like many senior officers, Fallon was also concerned that long-term manpower demands in Iraq are doing serious damage to the military, with little chance of producing ultimate success.

President Bush disagrees with that assessment as well. As commander in chief, he has a right to promote those officers who share his vision, to expect obedience and public silence from those who disagree, and to demand resignations from those for whom silence becomes impossible.

However, while Fallon's outspokenness made his resignation necessary and ended his career, it has served a valuable purpose. It demonstrates that the sometimes bitter debate about Iraq policy now being conducted in the political arena is being echoed by a similar, if more muted, debate within the military itself. And in both arenas, that debate reflects differences of judgment, not differences of patriotism.

— Jay Bookman, for the editorial board